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Abstract 
The study assesses the role of financial development on income inequality in a panel of 48 
African countries for the period 1996 to 2014. Financial development is defined in terms of 
depth (money supply and liquid liabilities), efficiency (from banking and financial system 
perspectives), activity (at banking and financial system levels) and stability while, three 
indicators of inequality are used, namely, the: Gini coefficient, Atkinson index and Palma 
ratio. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments. When financial 
sector development indicators are used exclusively as strictly exogenous variables in the 
identification process, it is broadly established that with the exception of financial stability, 
access to credit (or financial activity) and intermediation efficiency have favourable income 
redistributive effects. The findings are robust to the: control for unobserved heterogeneity in 
terms of time effects and inclusion of time invariant variables as strictly exogenous variables 
in the identification process. The findings are also robust to the Kuznets hypothesis: a humped 
shaped nexus between increasing GDP per capita and inequality. Policy implications are 
discussed.   
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1. Introduction 
Does financial development lead to economic growth? This is a question that has sparked a lot 
of interest in the academic literature in past decades, and economists have now reached a 
consensus that a well-functioning and properly regulated financial sector induces growth 
(Calderón and Liu, 2003; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Greenwood et al. 2013). This is 
largely possible due to the capacity of the financial sector of being able to allocate funds to 
the greatest benefit of the economy. Consequently, financial markets alongside financial 
intermediaries are the best positioned to play this role, thanks to their momentous role of 
being able to move funds throughout the economy. Levine (2005) describes several channels 
through which financial development can foster economic growth. Firstly, by (i) enabling the 
exchange of goods and services via the delivery of payment services, (ii) allocating savings to 
their most productive use, (iii) monitoring investments and carrying out corporate governance, 
and (iv) diversifying, increasing liquidity and reducing intertemporal risk.  
Africa witnessed a strong economic performance over the past two decades, which led to the 
eminent narrative of an “Africa rising”. However, one could have taught of this growth to be 
more inclusive, leading to a significant reduction in poverty. Contrary to expectations, 
Africa’s growth story has wretchedly not been pro-poor, and subsequently little impact felt on 
poverty reduction. Sadly, income inequality has also not ensued fast enough, and remains 
stubbornly high, suggesting that the strong growth has largely been enjoyed by the richest 
Africans, thereby causing the gap between the rich and the poor to become wider. This 
therefore stands as a major cause for concern. Additionally, the fact that income inequality 
remains stubbornly high in Africa (despite the strong economic performance), leads us to 
think whether we have explored all strategies through which this problem can be addressed. 
Albeit this study recognizes that there is a large body of literature dedicated to analyzing the 
causes and consequences of high income inequality, it is however unfortunate to notice that 
the attention directed to the African context has been limited. It is against this background that 
this study derives its motivation, with this imminent question: Could financial development 
be a key component (albeit overlooked) in reducing income inequality in Africa?  
There is a consensus that a developed financial sector can offer practicable answers to address 
economic crises. However, in a scenario where access to financial services is solely limited to 
individuals based on their level of income, there is a prospect that financial sector 
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development could bring about uneven growth, which in turn may lead to a wider income gap. 
To this end, the trend of rising income inequality is one of the most central challenges for 
policymakers in both developed and developing countries, albeit more apparent and severe in 
the latter group. Income inequality carries several implications, and is harmful for the 
macroeconomic stability of the overall economy. Explicitly, reducing income inequality will 
suggest an uneven increase in the income of the poor relative to that of the rich. How can this 
be effectively attained without any detrimental effects? This is the puzzling question that 
continues to glow economic debates. However, the goal of this study is not focused on 
examining all routes and channels through which that can be attained, but is mainly centred 
on the role played by financial development. Failure to address the inequality issue in Africa 
implies that many countries will remain exposed to political, social and economic upheavals. 
Considering the above information, the main research question that this study attempts to 
answer is: what is the impact of financial development on income inequality in Africa? The 
literature has clearly established the link between financial development and economic 
growth, but it nevertheless does not give a conclusive answer to the finance-inequality nexus. 
At the current state of the literature, it is ambiguous, especially on the theoretical side, as to 
which part of the society profits from the growth brought about by financial development.  
Faced with austere banking crises during the 1980s and 1990s, a great number of sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) countries undertook several reforms to promote financial development and 
subsequently growth. They loosened interest rates, cancelled fixed credit, switched to indirect 
monetary policy instruments, restructured and privatized banks, strengthened banking sector 
supervision and microfinance (Singh et al. 2009). In general, the effects of these reforms were 
reckoned positive, albeit significant challenges remain, considering that access to appropriate 
financial services by the population together with small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
remains meagre. Accordingly, SSA’s financial sector remains amongst the least developed 
worldwide with limited outreach, with the situation relatively worse for Franc Zone countries. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2016), although still shallow as opposed 
to other regions in the world, financial depth (measured by the private sector credit to GDP) 
has increased in SSA over the past decades. The region’s median ratio of private sector credit 
to GDP has increased by almost 10 percentage points since 1995, to nearly 21% in 2014. It is 
commendable, but nevertheless remains well below the performance seen in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA). Adding to the aforesaid is the fact that income inequality in SSA 
remains obdurately high, despite the implementation of these financial reforms. The African 
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Development Bank (AfDB, 2012) cites Africa as the world’s second-most-unequal continent 
after Latin America, with high levels of inequality persisting over 60 years. This evidence 
underpins that rich Africans, who account for less than 5% of the total population, hold nearly 
20% of total income, while the poor who accounts for more than half of the population owns 
just 36.5% of the continent’s total income. These high inequality levels observed in Africa 
suggest that economic performance achieved thus far has not been robust enough to reduce 
the large income disparities, despite the implementation of financial reforms.  
It is thus vital to investigate this nexus, as persistent rising income inequality can be 
detrimental to poverty reduction efforts. In fact, economic theory does not provide a clear-cut 
hypothesis regarding the relationship between financial development and income inequality. 
While one strand of the literature posits that income inequality can be reduced by increasing 
the availability of financial services to the poor (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and 
Zeira,1993), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) suggest a non-linear relationship between 
finance and inequality. Considering the above, this paper therefore seeks to gain further 
insights into the relationship between financial development and income inequality, with a 
special attention to the African context where research has been relatively scant, although 
growing. Undertaking this study is particularly relevant in this era dominated by financial 
crises (referring to the most recent 2008-2009 financial crisis) and economic headwinds. 
The contributions of this paper are threefold. Firstly, whereas a large body of literature has 
explored the relationship between financial development and economic growth, some recent 
research has started to examine the finance-inequality nexus. Nevertheless, the results 
obtained from these studies are conflicting and ambiguous – both on the theoretical and 
empirical sides. For instance, on the theoretical front, while Greenwood and Javanovic (1990) 
predict an inverted U-shaped relationship between financial development and income 
inequality, where income inequality is expected to increase at the early stage of financial 
development, and later on decrease; Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman 
(1993) hypothesize a linear negative nexus.  
On the empirical side, the discrepancy is also evident. Whereas studies such as Clarke et al. 
(2006); Beck et al. (2007); Batuo et al. (2010) and Shahbaz and Islam (2011) found evidence 
that financial development helps to reduce income inequality, Tita and Aziakpono (2016) 
failed to find a significant negative nexus. In the same vein, while Kim and Lin (2011) argue 
that financial development helps reduce income inequality only if a country has reached a 
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threshold level of financial development, Adams and Klobodu (2016) and de Haan and Sturm 
(2016) found that financial development has a positive impact on income inequality. In line 
with the above discussion, there is evidence of ongoing inconsistencies in this area of study, 
suggesting that this topic is still under debate and there is a need for further analysis to be 
conducted.  
Secondly, this study seeks to examine the finance-inequality relationship in a panel data 
analysis, focusing exclusively on SSA countries. While acknowledging that this area of study 
is gaining more attention, scholarly interest has not been oriented towards the African context 
because of limited data. Consequently, many studies have mixed both developed and 
developing countries in their samples (see for instance, Beck et al. 2004, 2007; Mookerjee and 
Kalipioni, 2010; Kappel, 2010; Jauch and Watzka, 2016), exposing the study to a sample 
heterogeneity bias.  This study will therefore attempt to fill this existing gap and while doing 
so, we are also able to deal with the heterogeneity problem which has been an issue in 
previous studies. 
Thirdly, the extant literature indicates that the few studies that focused on Africa are the 
papers by Kai and Amori (2009), Batuo et al. (2010), Tita and Aziakpono (2016) and Neaime 
and Gaysset (2018). However, these studies present some shortcomings. They used a strictly 
confined definition of financial development, which captures only one dimension – financial 
depth. These studies measured financial development using the proxies: private sector credit 
to gross domestic product (GDP), money supply (M2) to GDP, liquid liabilities to GDP, and 
number of automated teller machines (ATMs) per 100,000. These proxies fall under the 
financial development dynamic of depth, neglecting other dimensions, which are; activity, 
efficiency, stability, despite their significance. Financial activity is important in reducing 
income inequality as it captures the capability of banks to grant credit to economic operators. 
Moreover, whereas an efficient financial system permits individuals and SMEs to afford 
financial services at the lowest available cost, which in turn is very beneficial for the poor, it 
is imperative to have a stable financial system as it encourages the poor to accumulate capital 
and make investments. Considering the above points, this study goes beyond the extant 
literature and examines the finance-inequality nexus, by integrating all the distinct dimensions 
of financial development. 
 
The closest study in the literature to ours is by Asongu and Tchamyou (2014), who examined 
how investment-driven finance affects inequality in Africa using the Two-Stage Least Squares 
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(2SLS) approach. To proxy financial development, the study used four dimensions of 
financial development, namely: depth, efficiency, activity and size. The main findings of this 
study suggest that except for foreign investment, financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, 
activity and size improve equalizing income-distribution through domestic, private and public 
investment channels. However, in the empirical estimation, the study did not account for the 
non-linear dynamic of the finance-inequality nexus as proposed by Kuznets (1955). We 
therefore go beyond the present study and investigate whether our findings would underpin 
the non-linear hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped hypothesis in Africa. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 examines the theoretical and empirical 
literature. Data and methodology are discussed and outlined in Section 3. While Section 4 is 
dedicated to the empirical analysis, Section 5 concludes with implications and future research 
directions.  
 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
2.1 Theoretical Literature 
In this section, theoretical premises underpinning the relationship between financial 
development and income inequality are provided. The financial development-income 
inequality nexus draws its origin from the pioneer work of Kuznets (1955), who established 
the famous Kuznets curve, advocating a non-linear relationship between financial 
development and income inequality. Kuznets’ argument supports that in the early stages of 
development, income disparities increase due to the rapid rate of urbanisation (as the 
population move from low agricultural productivity jobs to high productivity jobs in 
industries where average income is higher). In the intermediate phase of development 
however, the relationship is expected to stabilise and should then start to decline in the 
advanced stage as a result of public redistribution policies. 
Three main theories underpin the work on the relationship between financial development and 
income inequality. The first theory by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) postulates an 
inverted U-shaped nexus. The study built a model of financial development, growth and wage 
distribution where the use of financial intermediaries generally enhances trade, as it is well 
known that transacting through these intermediaries entails both greater and secure profits. 
Nonetheless, it was accentuated that transacting through intermediaries usually comes at a 
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cost, which is often higher at the early phase of development. Due to constraints of high 
associated costs and low income, the poor population group might not be able to use the 
services; and this may only benefit the rich, causing income inequality to widen. As the 
economy approaches the intermediate phase, financial intermediaries begin to develop. 
Consequently, national savings rate will increase, causing the income disparity to widen given 
the poor capacity of the underprivileged to save. As the economy transitions to the 
intermediate phase and then to the advanced stage, income inequality will start to decline, as 
more agents will see their income grow given the easier access to financial intermediaries. 
The above reasoning, which concurs with that of Kuznets (1955), translates into an inverted 
U-shaped relationship, with income inequality increasing at the early stage of financial 
development and dropping at the advanced stage of financial development. 
In later years, this school of thought was challenged by another strand of literature which 
posits a negative linear relationship between financial development and income inequality. 
The model built by Banerjee and Newman (1993) is based on the initial assumption that 
finance can provide entrepreneurship opportunities. However, several financial market 
imperfections such as high transaction costs and contract enforcement hinder the low-income 
group from making investment and becoming entrepreneurs, as they often have no credit 
histories and lack the requisite collateral needed by financial institutions. Within this context, 
it goes without saying that the poor will have limited access to credit even if they are in the 
possession of high-profitability projects, and are therefore most likely to work for better-off 
employers, earning much lesser than what they should. This in turn proposes that should 
financial markets become accessible, efficient and stable, regardless of the background, 
entrepreneurs will be able to gain access to capital, thus translating to a decrease in income 
inequality. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the third strand of the literature, initiated by Galor and Zeira 
(1993) is based on the assertion that with imperfect credit markets, income inequalities 
prevent an efficient allocation of resources by reducing the ability of poor households to 
invest in human and physical capital. The model by Galor and Zeira (2003) is centered on the 
argument that individuals are on par in terms of their capacities or potential abilities, yet tend 
to differ in terms of their inherited wealth. Due to imperfect information and high transaction 
costs, the poor are usually faced with lending constraints and are therefore likely to invest less 
in human capital as opposed to the rich. In the model, the inheritance received by each 
individual defines whether he/she will invest in human capital (education) to become skilled. 
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As such, the future of a household will consequently be defined by its initial wealth. Rich 
families will therefore tend to invest in human capital and become skilled, amass enough and 
leave large inheritances for the future while poor families, with little bequests will remain 
unskilled and amass little for the future generations. Even if it becomes possible for the poor 
to finance human capital, the hindrances related to financial market imperfections prevent 
them from doing so. Consequently, in the long-run, the distribution of income will therefore 
be determined by the level of investment in human capital, with the latter being contingent on 
the initial wealth inheritance.   
Considering the above theoretical discussions, it goes without saying that for each theory, 
there is a unique mechanism though which financial development impacts income inequality.  
2.2 Empirical Literature 
Owing to the contradictory theoretical views of the effects of financial development on 
income inequality, there has been a growing empirical literature that seeks to test these 
theories. However, it is noteworthy to underline that studies directed to the African-context 
are limited.  
To examine the impact of financial development on income inequality, researchers have used 
several statistical techniques, ranging from basic Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to more 
complex methods like general equilibrium models. The influential study by Li, Squire and 
Zou (1998) empirically assessed the international and intertemporal variations in income 
inequality. Using Pooled OLS panel regressions with data for 49 developed and developing 
countries, the empirical analysis revealed that financial development proxied by money 
supply (M2 to GDP) is strongly linked with lower income inequality, measured by the Gini 
coefficient. Similarly, Clarke et al. (2006) investigated the impact of financial development on 
income inequality for 83 developed and developing countries from 1960 to 1985. Cognizant 
of endogeneity-related issues as pointed by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), the study used 
an instrumental variable approach. The results of the analysis suggested that there is negative 
relationship between financial development (proxied by private credit to GDP and claims on 
the non-financial domestic sector by deposit money banks to GDP) and income inequality. In 
other words, it is shown that greater financial development is linked to lower income 
inequality, which concurs with theoretical views from Galor and Zeira (1993).  
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In subsequent years, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2007) assessed the impact of 
financial development on income distribution and evidence confirms that greater financial 
development reduces income inequality, underpinning the theoretical prediction by Barnejee 
and Newman (1993). The results as well confirmed that financial development has a positive 
impact on the poor measured by the growth of the income share of the poorest group of the 
population. In the same vein, in a panel of developing and developed countries over the period 
1960 to 2005, Kim and Lin (2011) examined whether the extent of a nation’s development in 
financial sectors induces nonlinearity in the nexus between financial development and income 
inequality. With the aid of an Instrumental variable threshold regression approach, the study 
found evidence that financial development improves income distribution, but this nevertheless 
depends on the stages of financial development that the country is undergoing. Similarly, 
using dynamic panel data methods, Seven and Coskun (2013) examined the impact of bank 
and stock market developments on income inequality and poverty in a set of 45 emerging 
countries. The findings indicate that financial development does not have a significant impact 
on the poorest segments of society in emerging countries. More recently, using an unbalanced 
dataset of 138 developed and developing countries over the years 1960 to 2008, Jauch and 
Watzka (2016) found that, unlike other studies, financial development has a positive effect on 
income inequality. 
In a country-specific setting, Law and Tan (2009) examined the role of financial development 
and income inequality in Malaysia over the period 1980 to 2000. Supported by the 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) technique, the empirical results found that financial 
development was insignificant towards reducing income inequality in Malaysia. In addition, 
Ang (2010) examined how finance impacts income inequality in India using annual data 
spanning from 1951 to 2004. With the aid of an error correction model (ECM) cointegration 
and ARDL techniques, the study found that financial development helps reduce income 
inequality, however, financial liberalization worsens it. Similarly, using the ARDL method 
with data spanning from 1971 to 2005, Shahbaz and Islam (2011) studied the relationship 
between financial development and income inequality; while at the same time exploring if the 
Greenwood and Jovanovic hypothesis applies to Pakistan. The study found that financial 
development lessens income inequality while financial instability aggravates it. 
From an African perspective, Kai and Hamori (2009) examined the relationship between 
globalization, financial deepening, and inequality in a panel data setting of 29 sub-Saharan 
Africa countries between 1980 and 2002. The results confirmed that financial deepening helps 
11 
 
to reduce inequality in sub-Saharan Africa, albeit globalization was found to reduce the 
equalizing effects of financial deepening. As such, the study concluded that financial 
deepening through globalization leads to the formation of a financial system that benefits the 
rich. It was therefore recommended that domestic financial markets should be cultivated first 
in order to shape their development such that inequality is reduced. Similarly, with data 
covering 22 African countries for the period 1990 to 2004, Batuo et al. (2010) found that 
income inequality decreases as economies develop their financial sector, which is on par with 
evidence from previous research. The results also confirm that educational attainment play a 
significant role in making income distribution more equal.  
Using a balanced panel of 15 African countries from 1985 to 2007, Tita and Aziakpono 
(2016) examined whether financial development in Africa has an effect on income inequality 
and whether this effect depends on the level of financial development or economic 
development. The study found no evidence of a statistically significant negative linear 
relationship between finance and income inequality, apart from a weak evidence in Côte 
d’Ivoire. Nevertheless, there was evidence of the Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) inverted 
U-shape hypothesis in Botswana, Lesotho and Rwanda, though the nexus was contingent on 
the measure of financial development. 
A more recent study by Neaime and Gaysset (2018) established that financial inclusion 
reduces inequality (measured with the Gini coefficient) in the MENA. Results from the study 
suggested that MENA policymakers face two dilemmas – whether to focus on reforms to 
promote financial inclusion, innovation and financial access or concentrate on further 
improvements in financial stability.   
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data description 
Our sample contains an unbalanced panel of 48 countries in SSA, with data spanning from 
1996 to 2014. The choice of countries as well as the selected time frame is largely influenced 
by the availability of data. The dependent variable of the study, income inequality is proxied 
by the commonly used Gini coefficient, which is a ratio of the areas on the Lorenz curve 
diagram. The major constraint encountered in this study is the lack of available data on 
income inequality. The Gini coefficient data used in this study is sourced from a newly 
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created data set, the Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP)2 by Lahoti et al. (2016). 
The GCIP is itself based on a variety of common secondary sources such as the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS), UNU-WIDER (the United Nations University World Institute for 
Development Economics Research) World Income Inequality Database (WIID) and the 
World Bank’s Povcalnet database, amongst others. Where applicable, for non-survey years, 
the values were estimated through either an interpolation or extrapolation3 using growth rate 
figures from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and other sources where necessary. 
The coefficient is measured on a scale of 0 to 1, with the value of 0 corresponding to perfect 
income equality – implying everyone in the society receives the same level of income, while 1 
here will mean perfect inequality – where one person receives all the income. Though the 
Gini coefficient, to some degree, reflects the distribution of income, it is unable to show the 
welfare of the low-income group (Naceur and Zhang, 2016). This study also uses two 
additional measures of income inequality notably the Atkinson index and Palma ratio, as a test 
for robustness. The Atkinson index is a popular measure of income inequality, which 
measures the percentage of total income that a given society would have to forego in order to 
have more equal shares of income between its citizens. On the other hand, the Palma ratio is 
the ratio of national income shares of the top 10 per cent of households to the bottom 40 per 
cent. These measures complement the traditional Gini coefficient. The same justification has 
been provided for the use of these inequality indicators in recent literature (Tchamyou, 2018a, 
2018b; Tchamyou et al. 2018).  
The financial development indicators used in this study are sourced from the Financial 
Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank. In accordance with Asongu 
(2013), this study uses complementary indicators to the existing FDSD. For each of the 
financial development dynamics (except for the stability dynamic) used in this study, two 
measures will be employed – this serves as a test of robustness to access the consistency of 
our results. 
We measure financial deepening by the commonly used broad money supply and liquid 
liabilities, both expressed as a percentage of GDP. Higher values of these proxies will suggest 
deeper financial institutions. Contrary to conventional definitions of “bank efficiency”, this 
study defines efficiency as the bank’s ability to proficiently accomplish their essential role of 
                                                          
2
 The GCIP constructs consumption and income estimates for each country in each year as follows. In the first step, data on relative 
distributions and levels for each country from various existing sources are collected and a unique set of per capita surveys is selected. Next, 
the data is standardized and in the third step, consumption and income means are estimated. Using the mean and distributional data 
generated, a Lorenz curve is estimated for the survey years. 
3
 Lahoti et al. (2016) noted that the estimates for survey years are not affected in any way by the interpolation/extrapolation. 
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converting deposits into credit. To proxy efficiency, we use indicators of both banking-
system-efficiency (bank credit on bank deposits) and financial system efficiency (financial 
system credit on financial system deposits). Similarly, to proxy activity, we use indicators 
from both the banking and the financial sector, with respective proxies of “private domestic 
credit by deposit banks” and private credit by domestic banks and other financial institutions. 
Regarding the financial dynamic of stability, we used the Bank Z-score. A high Z-score will 
imply a lower probability of insolvency. The adoption of a multitude of financial development 
variables for robustness purposes departs from a recent strand of African financial 
development literature which is based on a few financial development indicators (Fowowe 
2014; Daniel 2017; Wale and Makina 2017;  Chikalipah 2017; Bocher et al. 2017; Osahand 
Kyobe  2017; Oben and Sakyi 2017; Ofori-Sasu et al. 2017; Chapoto and Aboagye 2017; 
Iykeand Odhiambo 2017; Boadi et al. 2017).  
To control for other factors that may impact income inequality, we use a set of other variables 
as directed in the existing literature (see for example Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990; Beck et 
al. 2007). These include real GDP per capita, inflation rate, remittances and political stability. 
These control variables are sourced from the World Development Indicators (WDI), except 
for political stability which is sourced from the World Governance Indicators (WGI). A 
complete definitions and sources of all variables are provided in Appendix 1 while summary 
statistics and sampled countries are disclosed respectively in Panel A and Panel B of 
Appendix 2. The correlation matrix is presented in Appendix 3. From the summary statistics, 
it is apparent that the variables are comparable in terms of means and from the corresponding 
standard deviations, we can be confident that reasonable estimated linkages will be derived. 
The purpose of the correlation matrix is to mitigate concerns about multicollinearity from the 
adoption of variables with a high degree of substitution in the conditioning information set. 
Expected signs of Controls 
The real GDP per capita is used as an indicative for the stage of development of a given 
economy. As posited by Kuznets (1955), the finance-inequality nexus follows an inverted U-
shape pattern with inequality rising at the initial stage of development and falling at later 
phases. Accordingly, this coefficient could bear a positive or negative sign contingent on the 
level of economic development. Indeed, the fact that our sample mostly consists of countries 
that are in their early stages of development will mean that the coefficient of this variable is 
expected to be positive.  
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The inflation rate here captures the monetary stability of the economy. We expect this 
coefficient to bear a positive sign. Underpinned by Easterly and Fischer (2001) and Jeanneney 
and Kpodar (2011) arguments, a higher inflation rate is more likely to hurt the poor than the 
rich as the latter group is less exposed to macroeconomic shocks given that they have better 
access to financial instruments. We also used remittances and political stability as controls, 
and we expect both variables to decrease income inequality.    
 
3.2 Empirical Model and Estimation Procedure 
To examine the relationship between financial development and income inequality, this study 
relies on the following model specification: 
 ܩ����� =  ߙ + ߚ଴ܩ����,�−ଵ + ߚଵܨ��� + ߚଶܩ���� + ߚଷܩ����ଶ +  ߛ��� + �� + ���(1) 
 
In Equation (1), i and t denote country and time period, respectively. The dependent variable 
Giniit captures to what degree income dispersion in an economy diverges from a perfectly 
equal distribution. The main explanatory variable, FDit is the financial development which is 
captured by seven proxies covering distinct dimensions of financial development and GDPit is 
the per capita GDP and ܩ����ଶ is its squared term which is introduced in the model to mainly 
control for the Kuznets hypothesis which suggest that at the initial stage of development, 
inequality will rise and then will start falling at later stages. Xit is a set of control variables as 
previously explained and it includes inflation rate, remittances and political stability. μi and ԑit 
correspondingly account for countries’ specific effects and the error term. Following this 
specification, we expect the coefficient of financial development (β1) to be negative and 
significant. Similarly, for the Kuznets curve to hold, we expect β2 to be positive and 
significant while β3  is projected to be negative.  
 
Examining the effects of financial development on income inequality is not without hurdles. 
The main identification problem that may arise is if some of our exogeneous variables are 
correlated with the error term. As such, estimating the aforesaid equations using the OLS may 
lead to inconsistent and biased estimates, given that the lagged of Gini (ܩ����,�−ଵ) is 
endogenous to the fixed effects (��). Because of the strong likelihood of a correlation between 
the lagged term and the error term, OLS estimates even after accounting for fixed and random 
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effects may result to biased estimates. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
developed by Hansen (1982) may correct this endogeneity issue. In fact, first differencing 
equation (1) removes any unobserved time-invariant country specific effects, thus eliminating 
any potential source of bias. This method, which was developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
assumes that time-varying disturbances in the original levels equation are not serially 
correlated. However, this difference-GMM has a shortcoming in that when variables that are 
not strictly exogenous are first differenced, they become endogenous, since the first difference 
will be correlated with the error term. Addressing this endogeneity issue will require using an 
Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, which requires instrumenting the predetermined and 
endogenous variables in first differences with their appropriate lags in levels, while strictly 
exogenous regressors are first-differenced for use as instruments in the first-differenced 
equation. The main issue arising in the application of the difference-GMM is mainly in the 
efficiency of the estimates, as this approach has been proved to be relatively weak due to 
lagged levels often considered as relatively poor instruments for first differences. This can 
nevertheless be counteracted by using the system-GMM approach, which allows for the use of 
either lagged levels and lagged differences of the explanatory variables as instruments for 
endogenous variables. The instruments may however be valid only if there is no presence of 
serial correlation in the errors and only if the differences of the explanatory variables and 
errors are uncorrelated. As suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998), two tests are necessary to ensure that estimates from the GMM are consistent. These 
tests are the over-identifying tests of Sargan and Hansen, with the latter being robust as 
opposed to the former, but more sensitive to the number of instruments. Both tests test the 
null hypothesis that instruments are exogeneous. 
 
Based on its advantages, this study employs the GMM technique to investigate the finance-
inequality nexus in Africa. 
 
An in-depth discourse on identification, simultaneity and exclusion restrictions is essential for 
a robust GMM specification. The three points are substantiated in chronological order. First, 
whereas recent literature has identified time invariant variables as exclusively strictly 
exogenous variables (Tchamyou and Asongu, 2017), we complement the time invariant 
variables with other macroeconomic variables that are intuitively exogenous to the main 
independent variables of interest (or financial access).  
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The propositions (or complementary strictly exogenous variables) in Table 1 are 
financial sector development indicators which are based on a rethinking of the IMF financial 
system definition. In essence, the existing definition is decomposed into the formal and semi-
formal components of the financial system. Furthermore, the previously missing informal 
financial sector is incorporated into the conception and definition of the financial system 
because it is more adapted to sub-Saharan African countries. The connection between the 
mainstream financial access variables and propositions build on at least three factors. (i) The 
propositions which represent competition for shares in money supply between three financial 
sectors are connected to the mainstream financial development indicators because the 
conception and definition of mainstream financial system measures are based on financial 
sectors. (ii) It is intuitive and logical that financial sector competition measurements are more 
connected to financial access compared to their connection with inequality. (iii) The 
corresponding hypothesis of exclusion restriction (which is expanded below in the third 
strand) is also intuitive and logical, notably: financial sector development is very likely to 
affect inequality exclusively through financial access indicators.  
Given that the study also aims to investigate the Kuznets hypothesis (i.e. the linkage 
between increasing income and inequality), it is also relevant to discuss how the 
acknowledged strictly exogenous variables are related to income levels on the one hand and 
affect inequality through financial development on the other. First, from a conceptual 
standpoint, the financial sector development variables are associated with income levels 
because the IMF financial system definition (motivating the new indicators) is more relevant 
to high income countries compared to their low-income counterparts. Accordingly, the 
hypothesis underlying the IMF definition is more adapted to high income countries because 
the informal financial sector is more relevant to low income countries compared to high 
income countries. Second, cognizant of the fact that financial sector indicators are based on 
competition for shares in money supply, high income countries are more likely to be 
associated with higher levels of formal financial sector development. In essence, the notion 
that financial depth in the perspective of liquid liabilities is equal to money supply is more 
relevant to developed countries because in low income countries, many citizens do not have 
access to bank accounts. Overall, considering the above arguments, our hypothesis of 
exclusion restriction can also hold for the income channel.  
In the light of the above, the main suspected endogenous or endogenous explaining or 
predetermined variables are financial access and income channels while, the strictly 
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exogenous variables are the proposed financial sector development indicators. In order to 
improve feasible conditions for identification, the propositions are complemented with time 
invariant variables. The motivation for also considering time invariant indicators (or years) as 
strictly exogenous is because Roodman (2009) has argued that it is not feasible for the time 
invariant variables to be endogenous after first difference. With these underpinnings clarified, 
in the GMM specification, the procedure employed for financial sector development and the 
time invariant omitted indicators (or ivstyle) is ‘iv (propositions, years, eq(diff))’ while the 
procedure for examining the predetermined variables is the gmmstyle. The economic 
interpretation of the exclusion restriction is that years and propositions affect income 
inequality exclusively through financial access and income levels (which are mechanisms or 
channels).  
Secondly, instead of employing lagged explanatory indicators as instrumental 
variables, forward differenced indicators are used to address the issue of simultaneity or 
reverse causality. Helmet transformations are used to purge fixed effects, given that country 
fixed effects are correlated with the error terms. The elimination of fixed effects with this 
strategy is consistent with recent literature (Arellano and Bover 1995; Love and Zicchino 
2006). It is important to note that this process of instrumentation is different from the standard 
procedure of deducting non-contemporary observations from contemporary observations. 
Instead, forward mean-variations are used in place of first difference (see Roodman 2009). 
Such transformations enable parallel or orthogonal conditions between the forward-
differenced observations and lagged observations. Within this framework, in order to 
maximise degrees of freedom or reduce loss in observations, the underlying transformations 
are executed for all observations with the exception of the last year in each cross section or 
country.  
 Thirdly, as far as exclusion restrictions are concerned, strictly exogenous variables 
(i.e. time invariant indicators and financial sector development variables) are expected to 
impact inequality exclusively via the suspected endogenous or predetermined variables (i.e. 
financial sector development and income levels). The statistical validity of the corresponding 
exclusion restriction is investigated with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the strict 
exogeneity of instruments or strictly exogenous variables. From a practical perspective, the 
null hypothesis associated with the DHT should not be rejected in order for the hypothesis of 
strictly exogenous variables to be confirmed. The intuition and theoretical basis for this 
inference is not different from the information criterion used to assess the validity of 
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instruments in a standard Instrumental Variable estimation approach, notably: a rejection of 
the alternative hypothesis of the Sargan overidentifying restrictions test. For instance, in Beck 
et al. (2003), the rejection of the alternative hypothesis in the Sargan test is an indication that 
the selected instruments explain the outcome variable exclusively via the proposed channels 
or endogenous variables’ mechanisms. In the same vein, within the framework of this study, 
the DHT is the information criterion employed to establish whether the acknowledged strictly 
exogenous variables exhibit strict exogeneity. In the light of these insights and clarifications, 
in the findings that are reported in the next section, the hypothesis of exclusive restriction 
holds, if and only if the DHT associated with instrumental variables (iv) (propositions, years, 
eq(diff)) is not rejected.  
Table 1: Summary of propositions used for the identification  
Panel A: GDP-based financial development indicators 
Propositions Name(s) Formula Interpretation 
Proposition 1 Formal financial 
development  
Bank deposits/GDP Bank deposits4  here refer to demand, time and 
savings deposits in deposit money banks. 
Proposition 2 Semi-formal financial 
development 
(Financial deposits – Bank 
deposits)/ GDP 
Financial deposits5 are demand, time and saving 
deposits in deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions. 
Proposition 3 Informal financial 
development 
(Money Supply – Financial 
deposits)/GDP 
 
 
Proposition 4 
Informal and semi-
formal financial 
development  
(Money Supply –  Bank 
deposits)/GDP 
 
Panel B: Measures of financial sector importance 
Proposition 5 Financial 
intermediary 
formalization 
Bank deposits/ Money 
Supply (M2) 
From ‘informal and semi-formal’ to formal 
financial development (formalization)6 . 
Proposition 6 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization’ 
(Financial deposits – Bank 
deposits)/ Money Supply 
From ‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal 
financial development (Semi-formalization)7. 
Proposition 7 Financial 
intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
(Money Supply – Financial 
deposits)/ Money Supply 
From ‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal 
financial development (Informalization)8. 
Proposition 8 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization and 
(Money Supply – Bank 
Deposits)/Money Supply  
Formal to ‘informal and semi-formal’ financial 
development: (Semi-formalization and 
informalization) 9 
                                                          
4
 Lines 24 and 25 of the International Financial Statistics (October 2008).  
5
 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of the International Financial Statistics (2008).  
6
 “Accordingly, in undeveloped countries money supply is not equal to liquid liabilities or bank deposits. While 
in undeveloped countries bank deposits as a ratio of money supply is less than one, in developed countries this 
ratio is almost equal to 1. This indicator appreciates the degree by which money in circulation is absorbed by 
the banking system.  Here we define ‘financial formalization’ as the propensity of the formal banking system to 
absorb money in circulation”. 
7
 “This indicator measures the rate at which the semi-formal financial sector is evolving at the expense of formal 
and informal sectors”.  
8
 “This proposition appreciates the degree by which the informal financial sector is developing to the detriment 
of formal and semi-formal sectors”. 
9
 “The proposition measures the deterioration of the formal banking sector in the interest of other financial 
sectors (informal and semi-formal). From common sense, propositions 5 and 8 should be almost perfectly 
antagonistic, meaning the former (formal financial development at the cost of other financial sectors) and the 
latter (formal sector deterioration) should almost display a perfectly negative degree of substitution or 
correlation”.  
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informalization’  
N.B: Propositions 5, 6, 7 add up to unity (one) arithmetically spelling-out the underlying assumption of sector importance. 
Hence, when their time series properties are considered in empirical analysis, the evolution of one sector is to the detriment 
of other sectors and vice-versa. The propositions 5, 6, 7 and 8, which are elucidated further in footnotes, are all sourced from 
Asongu (2015).  
Source: Asongu (2015). 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Presentation of results  
The empirical results are presented in Table 2 and Table 3. Whereas in Table 2 the 
adopted strictly exogenous variables are financial sector development indicators, in Table 3 
the strictly exogenous variables are years (or time invariant variables) and financial sector 
development variables. The intuition for defining the strictly exogenous variables in two 
phases is to limit the influence time invariant variables on the hypothesis of exclusive 
restriction. It is important to note that, only four of the eight propositions in Table 1 are 
employed because of issues in high degrees of substitution. While Table 2 and Table 3 are 
focused on the Gini coefficient, for robustness checks, we also use the Atkinson index and the 
Palma ratio which are presented respectively in Panel A and Panel B of Appendix 4 and 
Appendix 5.  Hence, Appendix 4 which discloses findings on robustness checks without time 
effects uses the Atkinson index in Panel A and the Palma ratio in Panel B while Appendix 5 
which shows the results of robustness checks with time effects also uses the Atkinson index in 
Panel A and the Palma ratio in Panel B. 
While Table 2 and Table 3 disclose estimated values of adopted control variables, 
owing to lack of space, the estimated coefficients corresponding to the control variables are 
not reported for results in Appendix 4 and Appendix 5. Each block of results is characterised 
by four sets of specifications, with each specification corresponding to a financial 
development category. With the exception of financial stability (or Z-score), each other 
financial development is composed of two variables, namely: (i) financial depth is composed 
on overall economic depth (or money supply) and liquid liabilities or financial system 
deposits; (ii) financial efficiency is appreciated from banking system and financial system 
perspectives and (iii) financial activity or domestic credit is also defined in terms of banking 
system activity and financial system activity. It is imperative to note that the three 
measurements of financial development are broadly connected in the perspective that 
financial efficiency is the ratio of financial activity (or credit) on financial depth (or deposit), 
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namely: “banking system credit/bank system deposits” for banking system efficiency and 
“financial system credit/financial system deposits” for financial system efficiency. Hence, our 
conception and definition of financial efficiency is consistent with the fundamental mission of 
a bank which is to transform mobilised deposits into credit for households and investors 
(public and private). Moreover, the traditional notion of bank efficiency with respect to 
profitability (both in terms of returns on equity and assets) is less consistent with theoretical 
underpinnings of mitigating inequality by means of enhanced financial access. It is important 
to note that the financial development variables are specified independently in order to 
mitigate concerns of multicollinearity.  
Four statistical tests are used to evaluate the validity of the model. First, the null 
hypothesis corresponding to the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) 
in difference which is a position on the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not 
be rejected. It is also important to disclose one fundamental insight into this criterion. The 
second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test in difference takes precedence over the 
corresponding first-order test because the literature has exclusively relied on the former test to 
assess the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals (see Narayan et al., 2011). 
Second, the null hypotheses of the Hansen and Sargan over-identification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their alternative hypotheses are the positions that 
instruments are invalid or correlated with the error terms. Accordingly, whereas the Sargan 
OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but 
weakened by instruments. Consistent with recent literature (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016), 
the concern is addressed by preferring the Hansen test and limiting instrument proliferation by 
ensuring that the number of instruments are not higher than the number of countries in each 
specification.   
Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments is also 
employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Insights into the 
corresponding variables (dependent, endogenous explaining and strictly exogenous) have 
been disclosed in Section 3.2. Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated 
coefficients is also disclosed for the overall validity of models. 
The following findings can be established from Table 2. (i) With the exception of 
financial depth (i.e. money supply and liquid liabilities) which reduces inequality, the other 
financial development variables have a positive effect. (ii) Conversely in Panel A and Panel B 
of Appendix 4, except for financial stability which consistently has a positive effect on 
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inequality on the one hand and financial depth from which the effects are not significantly 
negative on the other hand, significant negative effects are apparent from financial efficiency 
and financial activity. When the findings are compared, and contrasted, it is reasonable to 
broadly establish that with the exception of financial stability, financial development in terms 
of access to credit and intermediation efficiency have positive income redistributive effects. 
The findings in Table 3 and Appendix 5 are broadly consistent with those in Table 2 
and Appendix 4 for which time invariant omitted variables are defined in terms of time 
dummies and strictly exogenous variables. (iii) The Kuznets hypothesis is confirmed because 
the relationship between increasing GDP per capita and inequality has an inverted U shape. 
Accordingly, when the unconditional (or uninteracted) effect is significantly positive while 
the conditional (marginal or interacted) effect is significantly negative, the humped shape is 
apparent (Ashraf and Galor, 2013). 
Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. (i) Accordingly, high 
inflation fuels inequality (Albanesi, 2007) while low inflation has been opposite effect (Bulir, 
1998; Lopez, 2004). The positive responsiveness of poverty to inflation is a decreasing 
function of income levels because the purchasing power of the population in the low-income 
strata is more negatively affected compared to their high-income counterparts. (ii) The effect 
of remittances is negative in the absence of time effects and positive otherwise. The positive 
effect which is the more robust impact is consistent with Anyanwu (2011) who has argued 
that remittances generally increase inequality in Africa because migrants tend to originate 
from high and upper-middle income households. (iii) Political stability can improve income 
inequality if it provides favourable conditions for the governing elite to materialise practices 
that maintain and promote the unequal distribution of the fruits of economic prosperity across 
the population.  
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Table 2: Finance access, Income and Income Inequality (without time effects) 
        
 Dependent variable: GINI coefficient  
 Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Stability 
 Money 
Supply  
Liquid 
Liabilities  
Banking sys. 
Efficiency 
Financial sys. 
Efficiency  
Banking sys. 
Activity  
Financial sys. 
Activity   
 
 M2(llgdp) Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrob Pcrobof Z-Score  
        
Constant  0.092*** 0.099*** 0.064*** 0.057*** 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.021 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.197) 
GINI (-1) 0.890*** 0.883*** 0.897*** 0.900*** 0.879*** 0.880*** 0.917*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
M2  -0.00004*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.002)       
Fdgdp --- -0.00007*** --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)      
BcBd --- --- 0.00008*** --- --- --- --- 
   (0.001)     
FcFd --- --- --- 0.006** --- --- --- 
    (0.019)    
Pcrob --- --- --- --- 0.00004* --- --- 
     (0.067)   
Pcrobof --- --- --- --- --- 0.00004** --- 
      (0.012)  
Z-Score  --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0001*** 
       (0.000) 
        
GDP per capita (GDPpc) -0.006 -0.007* -0.0008 0.0005 0.0004 0.001 0.009** 
 (0.113) (0.072) (0.828) (0.862) (0.925) (0.712) (0.027) 
GDPpc×GDPpc 0.0003 0.0004 -0.00007 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0008** 
 (0.199) (0.120) (0.780) (0.521) (0.645) (0.410) (0.011) 
Inflation   -0.00002 -0.00002* 0.00001 0.00003* 0.000007 0.00001 0.00001 
 (0.139) (0.051) (0.240) (0.054) (0.609) (0.419) (0.259) 
Political Stability  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Remittances  -0.00007*** -0.00004* 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00003 0.00002 -0.00005*** 
 (0.000) (0.060) (0.703) (0.602) (0.256) (0.384) (0.006) 
        
Time Effects No No No No No No No 
        
AR(1) (0.110) (0.110) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) (0.106) 
AR(2) (0.309) (0.305) (0.313) (0.312) (0.327) (0.327) (0.282) 
Sargan OIR (0.604) (0.540) (0.468) (0.522) (0.086) (0.104) (0.823) 
Hansen OIR (0.471) (0.572) (0.888) (0.793) (0.758) (0.679) (0.614) 
        
DHT for instruments        
(a)Instruments in levels        
H excluding group (0.551) (0.612) (0.499) (0.422) (0.492) (0.417) (0.582) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.372) (0.450) (0.952) (0.896) (0.805) (0.765) (0.530) 
        
(b) IV (Propositions, eq (diff))        
H excluding group (0.338) (0.403) (0.866) (0.756) (0.644) (0.633) (0.471) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.762) (0.866) (0.600) (0.583) (0.771) (0.553) (0.795) 
Fisher  8713.14*** 4933.67*** 2786.09*** 4001.71*** 4295.60*** 4905.08*** 15717.09*** 
Instruments  31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  585 585 587 585 585 585 536 
        
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. Sys: system. Fin: financial.  
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Table 3: Finance access, Income and Income Inequality (with time effects) 
 
        
 Dependent variable : GINI coefficient 
 Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Stability 
 Money 
Supply  
Liquid 
Liabilities  
Banking sys. 
Efficiency 
Financial sys. 
Efficiency  
Banking sys. 
Activity  
Financial sys. 
Activity   
 
 M2(llgdp) Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrob Pcrobof Z-Score  
        
Constant  0.088*** 0.089*** 0.065*** 0.059*** 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.059*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GINI (-1) 0.892*** 0.884*** 0.885*** 0.888*** 0.880*** 0.882*** 0.899*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
M2  -0.00003*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.001)       
Fdgdp --- -0.00006*** --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)      
BcBd --- --- 0.0001*** --- --- --- --- 
   (0.000)     
FcFd --- --- --- 0.009*** --- --- --- 
    (0.000)    
Pcrob --- --- --- --- 0.00004** --- --- 
     (0.010)   
Pcrobof --- --- --- --- --- 0.00003** --- 
      (0.010)  
Z-score  --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0001*** 
       (0.000) 
        
GDP per capita (GDPpc) -0.004** -0.004** -0.00002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.012) (0.030) (0.993) (0.493) (0.304) (0.438) (0.439) 
GDPpc×GDPpc 0.0002* 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003* -0.0002* -0.0002** 
 (0.092) (0.103) (0.431) (0.171) (0.056) (0.067) (0.049) 
Inflation   0.00001 0.000004 0.00003*** 0.00004*** 0.00002** 0.00003*** 0.000006 
 (0.250) (0.666) (0.006) (0.000) (0.018) (0.006) (0.534) 
Political Stability  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Remittances  0.00001 0.00004*** 0.00008*** 0.00004* 0.0001*** 0.00008*** 0.00003** 
 (0.190) (0.001) (0.006) (0.097) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) 
        
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
AR(1) (0.108) (0.253) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) (0.108) 
AR(2) (0.300) (0.519) (0.303) (0.301) (0.321) (0.316) (0.277) 
Sargan OIR (0.302) (0.714) (0.201) (0.143) (0.068) (0.069) (0.470) 
Hansen OIR (0.258) (0.264) (0.542) (0.438) (0.682) (0.590) (0.505) 
        
DHT for instruments        
(a) GMM Instruments for 
levels 
       
H excluding group (0.637) (0.714) (0.733) (0.587) (0.507) (0.494) (0.736) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.088) (0.264) (0.272) (0.279) (0.730) (0.596) (0.231) 
        
(b) gmm (lagged values)        
H excluding group (0.426) (0.438) (0.452) (0.471) (0.372) (0.404) (0.514) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.238) (0.511) (0.529) (0.410) (0.720) (0.596) (0.464) 
 
 
      
(c) IV (Propositions, Years, 
eq (diff)) 
       
H excluding group (0.318) (0.338) (0.743) (0.660) (0.469) (0.412) (0.502) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.287) (0.631) (0.325) (0.272) (0.724) (0.653) (0.460) 
 
 
      
Fisher  68312.42*** 17281.41*** 66637.25*** 190317.97*** 50974.91*** 44479.86*** 189484.32*** 
Instruments  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  585 585 587 585 585 585 536 
        
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.Sys: system. Fin: financial.  
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4. 2 Further discussion of results 
This section is engaged in four main strands, notably: nexus with the literature; emphasis on 
inequality indicators; specificities of financial development indicators and some discourse on 
convergence. The points are substantiated in chronological order.  
 First, on the nexus with existing literature, the narratives are first engaged in terms of 
African-specific literature before broadened in scope to more extended literature on 
developing countries. With respect to African specific literature, the findings are broadly 
consistent with Asongu and Tchamyou (2014) who have concluded that financial 
development in the perspectives of depth, activity, efficiency and size reduce income 
inequality through mechanisms of financial access such as aggregate investment dynamics. 
 
While we have not used the dynamic of financial size in this study, it is important to note that 
the conceptions and definitions of financial intermediary dynamics of depth, efficiency and 
activity, are similar with the underlying studies. The difference with our results may arise 
from the fact that the periodicity used in this study differs from the underlying study (1980-
2002 versus 1996-2014); sampled countries (13 versus 48 countries), definition of inequality 
(estimated household income inequality versus three measurements of income inequality) and 
the methodology approach (Two Stage Least Squares versus GMM) are different.  
 
 The fact that financial depth does broadly and consistently reduce income inequality 
(measured by the Gini) aligns with other studies that have focused exclusively on Africa, 
notably:  (i) Batuo et al. (2010) who have used a panel of 22 African countries for the period 
1990-2004 to establish that financial development mitigates income inequality and (ii) Kai 
and Hamori (2009) who have used the same inequality indicators and periodicity as in the first 
study (i.e. Asongu and Tchamyou, 2014) to conclude that financial depth has a favorable 
income redistributive effect. The notion of financial intermediary efficiency has not been 
explored in the scant literature because; the concepts of financial development have been 
restricted to the notions of depth (Kai and Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al. 2010) and activity 
(Batuo et al. 2010).  
 
Contrary with Naceur and Zhang (2016), which proxied financial stability by regulatory 
capital to risk-weighted assets and volatility of stock price index, our study used the 
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commonly used Z-score and finds that there is a positive relationship between financial 
stability and income inequality – for all proxies of inequality measures used.  
Comparing with other developing countries, our results are in contrast with Law and Tan 
(2009) who investigated the impact of financial development and income inequality in 
Malaysia using several measures of financial development and found that financial 
development is insignificant in reducing income inequality. However, our results go in line 
with that of Shahbaz and Islam (2011) who found that financial development measured by 
private sector credit reduces income inequality. Our findings are also broadly consistent with 
Neaime and Gaysset (2018) who have established that financial inclusion reduces inequality 
(measured with the Gini coefficient) in the MENA. We have focused on Africa, 
complemented the Gini coefficient with other inequality variables and used a multitude of 
financial development variables that are not exclusively associated with financial depth. This 
is essentially because the number of banks and ATMs used by Neaime and Gaysset (2018) are 
more linked to financial depth because they reflect the general proximity and usage of 
financial services. 
 Second, with regard to the specifics from inequality variables, it is very apparent cross 
specifications and panels that the Palma ratio and Atkinson index broadly have common 
responses to financial development, as opposed to the Gini index. Two main clarifications are 
worth engaging from policy and conceptual perspectives. On the policy front, our main 
findings have focused on estimations with the Palma ratio and Atkinson index because of 
their relevance in Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). On a conceptual angle, a principal 
advantage in the Palma ratio and Atkinson index is that they capture the tails of the inequality 
distribution (i.e. the richest and poorest), which is different from the Gini index that 
fundamentally articulates the entire distribution (see Cobham et al., 2015). It follows that the 
response of inequality to financial development is more apparent when tails of the inequality 
distributions are emphasised in the specifications. By extension, from logic and common 
sense, inequality in access to finance (which is naturally a dimension of income inequality) 
affects the responsiveness of income inequality to financial development.  
 
 Third, we now turn to specificities in financial development indicators. Building on 
previous narratives in this section, financial depth does not significantly reduce inequality on 
both conceptual and empirical fronts. On the conceptual dimension, financial depth does not 
necessarily reflect access to finance; partly because of surplus liquidity issues; partly because 
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money supply is not equivalent to formal financial sector development since a great chunk of 
the monetary base in African countries circulates outside the formal banking sector. 
Accordingly, financial deposits or liquid liabilities do not represent “access to finance” unless 
they are transformed into credit for households and economic operators (private and public). 
This is consistent with the substantially documented issues of surplus liquidity in African 
financial institutions (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009). The narrative is also in accordance with 
competition indicators because financial intermediation efficiency in this study is measured as 
the ability of financial institutions to transform deposits (or depth) into credit (or activity). It 
logically follows that since financial dynamics of efficiency and activity significantly reduce 
inequality, the insignificant effects of financial depth are traceable to the underlying 
conceptual and practical insufficiencies.  
 
 Before we conclude, it is also important to emphasis that there is some evidence of 
convergence in income inequality. This is essentially because the absolute value of the 
estimated lagged inequality variables is within the interval of zero and one. This confirms the 
hysteresis hypothesis on income inequality which supports the perspective that past 
observations of inequality determine future observations of inequality.  
 
5. Concluding implications and future research directions 
The study has assessed the role of financial development on income inequality in a panel of 
48 African countries for the period 1996 to 2014. Financial development is defined in terms 
of depth (money supply and liquid liabilities), efficiency (from banking and financial system 
perspectives), activity (at banking and financial system levels) and stability while, three 
indicators of inequality are used, namely, the: Gini coefficient, Atkinson index and Palma 
ratio. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments. When financial 
sector development indicators are used exclusively as strictly exogenous variables in the 
identification process, it is broadly established that with the exception of financial stability, 
access to credit (or financial activity) and intermediation efficiency have positive income 
redistributive effects. The findings are robust to the: control for unobserved heterogeneity in 
terms of time effects and inclusion of time invariant variables as strictly exogenous variables 
in the identification process. The findings are also robust to the Kuznets hypothesis: a humped 
27 
 
shaped nexus between increasing GDP per capita and inequality. In what follows, we discuss 
policy implications.  
Our study has clearly established that except for the dynamic of stability, financial 
development in terms of depth, efficiency and activity have positive income redistributive 
effects. Consequently, policies aimed at fostering financial deepening, as well as boosting 
financial efficiency and activity, should all be stimulated. 
Surplus liquidity issues are inhibiting the favourable income redistributive effects of financial 
development. That said, policies geared towards reducing the excess liquidity should be 
intensified. The excess liquidity, which reflects limited private sector lending and weak 
interbank activity, could be limited by encouraging banks and financial institutions to invest 
the excess liquidity in stock and bond markets. Given that both markets are still at a nascent 
stage of development in most African countries, measures to promote growth in these markets 
should be encouraged as well. Adding to this, boosting competition in lending between 
financial institutions could limit cash surplus in Africa.  
Future studies can improve the extant literature by assessing whether the established 
findings withstand empirical scrutiny within country-specific settings. Such is necessary for 
more targeted policy implications. Moreover, assessing the underlying linkages throughout 
the conditional distributions of income inequality could provide more insights into the 
investigated nexuses. This recommendation builds on the inference that inequality indicators 
that capture tails of the inequality distributions are more responsive to financial development. 
Hence, is it also worthwhile for future studies to tailor inequality specifications such that, they 
emphasize countries with high, intermediate and low levels of income inequality. In essence, 
blanket policies contingent on mean values of inequality may be ineffective unless they are 
aligned with initial/existing levels of inequality.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Definitions and sources of variables 
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. WGI: World Bank Governance Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and 
Structure Database. GCIP: Global Consumption and Income Project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Signs Definitions Sources   
    
Income Inequality Gini coefficient   GCIP 
    
 Atkinson index  GCIP 
    
 Palma ratio  GCIP 
    
Economic 
Financial Depth 
M2 Money Supply (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System 
Depth 
Fdgdp LiquidLiabilities (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking 
SystemEfficiency 
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System 
Efficiency 
FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking System 
Activity  
Pcrb Private domestic credit from deposit banks (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System 
Activity  
Pcrbof Private domestic credit from financial institutions 
(% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial Stability Z-Score  Prediction of the likelihood that a bank might 
survive and not go bankrupt.  
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
GDP per capita  GDPpc Logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Remittances Remit Remittance inflows to GDP (%) World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
 
Political Stability 
 
 
PolS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured 
as the perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized 
or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”.  
 
 
World Bank (WGI) 
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics (1996-2014) and Presentation of countries 
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min : Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs.: Observations. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial 
deposits (liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private 
domestic credit from deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions. 
Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. ICT: Information and Communication 
Technology. 
 Panel A: Summary statistics 
       
 Variables Mean S.D. Min. Max. Obs. 
       
Income 
Inequality 
Gini Index 0.587 0.041 0.488 0.868 911 
Atkinson 0.701 0.060 0.509 0.895 911 
Palma ratio 6.454 1.749 3.016 21.790 911 
       
 
 
Financial 
Development 
Economic Financial Depth (M2) 32.680 21.779 4.129 108.90 861 
Financial System Depth (Fdgdp)  26.272 20.610 1.690 97.823 862 
Banking SystemEfficiency (BcBd)  71.340 29.189 13.754 186.72 876 
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 0.756 0.391 0.137 2.606 862 
Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 18.829 17.630 0.551 102.54 862 
Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 20.707 23.575 0.551 150.21 862 
Financial Stability (Z-Score) 10.474 8.433 -12.024 89.931 782 
       
       
 
Control 
variables  
GDP per capita  6.706 1.098 4.286 9.660 907 
Inflation  15.818 144.139 -35.836 4145.10 873 
Political Stability  -0.511 0.904 -2.988 1.188 768 
Remittances  4.011 7.248 0.000 61.988 773 
       
 Panel B: Presentation of countries 
       
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia. 
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Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 539)  
Income Inequality Financial Development Dynamics Control variables  
             
Gini-Inc Atkin-Inc Palma-Inc M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Prcb Pcrbof Z-score  GDPpc Infl PolS Remit  
1.000 0.833 0.939 -0.267 -0.241 0.111 0.067 -0.148 -0.095 0.018 0.004 -0.015 0.274 0.070 Gini-Inc 
 1.000 0.878 -0.248 -0.215 -0.011 -0.049 0.782 -0.153 -0.071 0.014 0.069 0.303 0.221 Atkin-Inc 
  1.000 -0.232 -0.207 0.015 -0.019 -0.148 -0.134 -0.011 0.054 0.035  0.294 0.130 Palma-Inc 
   1.000 0.972 0.063 0.079 0.782 0.601 0.529 0.390 -0.055 0.197 0.077 M2 
    1.000 0.123 0.204 0.835 0.722 0.511 0.389 -0.056 0.227 0.060 Fdgdp 
     1.000 0.861 0.549 0.553 0.229 -0.006 -0.083 0.016 -0.156 BcBd 
      1.000 0.599 0.775 0.259 -0.098 -0.060 -0.015 -0.160 FcFd 
       1.000 0.918 0.528 0.340 -0.052 0.222 -0.029 Prcb 
        1.000 0.463 0.179 -0.041 0.147 -0.063 Pcrbof 
         1.000 0.280 -0.042 0.032 -0.027 Z-Score  
          1.000 -0.031 0.396 -0.045 GDPpc 
           1.000 -0.089 -0.023 Infl 
            1.000 0.070 PolS 
             1.000 Remit 
               
Gini-Inc: Gini of Income Inequality. Atkin-Inc: Atkinson of Income Inequality. Palma-Inc: Palma ratio of Income Inequality. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits (liquid 
liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit 
from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Z-Score: Probability of the Bank not to go bankrupt. GDPpc: GDP per capita. Infl: Inflation. PolS: Political Stability. Remit: 
remittances.  
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Appendix 4: Robustness checks without time effects  
 Panel A: Atkinson index 
 Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Stability 
 Money 
Supply  
Liquid 
Liabilities  
Banking sys. 
Efficiency 
 Banking sys. 
Activity  
Financial sys. 
Activity   
 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrob Pcrobof Z-Score 
        
Constant  0.040* 0.050** 0.029 0.019 0.022 0.026 -0.013 
 (0.071) (0.030) (0.234) (0.470) (0.365) (0.308) (0.652) 
Inequality (-1) 0.985*** 0.974*** 0.985*** 0.974*** 0.963*** 0.956*** 0.979*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Finance -0.00001 -0.00005 -0.0001*** -0.008*** -0.00003 -0.00005* 0.0001*** 
 (0.718) (0.256) (0.001) (0.000) (0.494) (0.060) (0.005) 
GDP per capita (GDPpc) -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.009 
 (0.262) (0.224) (0.838) (0.644) (0.654) (0.596) (0.215) 
GDPpc×GDPpc 0.0003 0.0003 -0.00001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0007 
 (0.409) (0.359) (0.981) (0.458) (0.474) (0.378) (0.144) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Time Effects No No No No No No No 
        
AR(1) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.093) (0.094) (0.095) 
AR(2) (0.532) (0.703) (0.152) (0.170) (0.737) (0.903) (0.530) 
Sargan OIR (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Hansen OIR (0.446) (0.418) (0.747) (0.618) (0.292) (0.255) (0.308) 
        
DHT for instruments        
(a)Instruments in levels        
H excluding group (0.689) (0.698) (0.484) (0.516) (0.634) (0.479) (0.799) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.256) (0.226) (0.797) (0.592) (0.148) (0.179) (0.104) 
        
(b) IV (Propositions, eq (diff))        
H excluding group (0.283) (0.276) (0.599) (0.390) (0.175) (0.143) (0.286) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.872) (0.815) (0.857) (0.989) (0.805) (0.832) (0.422) 
Fisher  3611.71*** 5131.49*** 5776.02*** 7869.04*** 2782.11*** 3152.97*** 9846.74*** 
Instruments  31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  585 585 587 585 585 585 536 
        
        
 Panel B: Palma ratio 
        
 Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Stability 
 Money 
Supply  
Liquid 
Liabilities  
Banking sys. 
Efficiency 
Financial sys. 
Efficiency  
Banking sys. 
Activity  
Financial sys. 
Activity   
 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrob Pcrobof Z-Score 
        
Constant  0.141 0.291 -0.549 -0.836 0.017 0.041 -1.342* 
 (0.737) (0.487) (0.538) (0.353) (0.974) (0.942) (0.053) 
Inequality (-1) 0.900*** 0.897*** 0.925*** 0.918*** 0.893*** 0.896*** 0.918*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Finance  -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.002** -0.221** 0.0002 -0.0003 0.003*** 
 (0.762) (0.181) (0.027) (0.041) (0.673) (0.486) (0.008) 
GDP per capita (GDPpc) 0.166 0.128 0.373 0.463* 0.208 0.203 0.570*** 
 (0.189) (0.296) (0.157) (0.073) (0.216) (0.228) (0.007) 
GDPpc×GDPpc -0.013 -0.010 -0.028 -0.034* -0.016 -0.016 -0.043*** 
 (0.152) (0.255) (0.130) (0.062) (0.177) (0.185) (0.005) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Time Effects No No No No No No No 
        
AR(1) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.097) 
AR(2) (0.320) (0.322) (0.310) (0.308) (0.321) (0.325) (0.326) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.399) (0.434) (0.594) (0.662) (0.478) (0.424) (0.507) 
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DHT for instruments        
(a)Instruments in levels        
H excluding group (0.801) (0.802) (0.687) (0.688) (0.718) (0.559) (0.684) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.399) (0.185) (0.418) (0.505) (0.270) (0.313) (0.321) 
        
(b) IV (Propositions, eq (diff))        
H excluding group (0.271) (0.300) (0.449) (0.518) (0.260) (0.224) (0.405) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.769) (0.777) (0.797) (0.808) (0.995) (0.988) (0.664) 
Fisher  3580.73*** 5983.94*** 2212.38*** 5617.98*** 5061.04*** 6500.68*** 4128.94*** 
Instruments  31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  585 585 587 585 585 585 536 
        
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and 
the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. Sys: system. Fin: financial.  
 
Appendix 5: Robustness check with time effects  
        
 Panel A: Atkinson index 
 Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Stability 
 Money 
Supply  
Liquid 
Liabilities  
Banking sys. 
Efficiency 
 Banking sys. 
Activity  
Financial sys. 
Activity   
 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrob Pcrobof Z-Score 
        
Constant  0.021 0.040* 0.005 -0.001 0.019 0.022 -0.038 
 (0.263) (0.055) (0.793) (0.942) (0.346) (0.276) (0.133) 
Inequality (-1) 0.967*** 0.952*** 0.968*** 0.956*** 0.942*** 0.942*** 0.975*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Finance -0.000004 -0.00004 -0.00007*** -0.007*** 0.00002 -0.00002 0.00009*** 
 (0.884) (0.162) (0.004) (0.000) (0.344) (0.252) (0.005) 
GDP per capita (GDPpc) 0.001 -0.0008 0.007 0.012** 0.007 0.006 0.017** 
 (0.791) (0.874) (0.180) (0.034) (0.182) (0.173) (0.013) 
GDPpc×GDPpc -0.0001 -0.00002 -0.0006 0.000002 -0.0006 -0.0006* -0.001*** 
 (0.613) (0.952) (0.122) (0.914) (0.102) (0.075) (0.007) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
AR(1) (0.090) (0.092) (0.092) (0.093) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) 
AR(2) (0.301) (0.524) (0.137) (0.248) (0.442) (0.674) (0.535) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.686) (0.614) (0.745) (0.472) (0.539) (0.437) (0.280) 
        
DHT for instruments        
(a) GMM Instruments for 
levels 
       
H excluding group (0.777) (0.779) (0.702) (0.771) (0.698) (0.696) (0.946) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.410) (0.312) (0.603) (0.176) (0.300) (0.195) (0.019) 
        
(b) gmm (lagged values)        
H excluding group (0.445) (0.456) (0.467) (0.444) (0.423) (0.440) (0.398) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.691) (0.606) (0.747) (0.457) (0.539) (0.421) (0.269) 
        
(c) IV (Propositions, Years, 
eq (diff)) 
       
H excluding group (0.175) (0.179) (0.363) (0.242) (0.100) (0.087) (0.402) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.955) (0.908) (0.879) (0.679) (0.939) (0.883) (0.225) 
 
       
Fisher  35700.93*** 56786.91*** 5554.89*** 22467.35*** 7790.56*** 17734.15*** 7642.91*** 
Instruments  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  585 585 587 585 585 585 536 
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 Panel B: Palma ratio 
        
 Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Stability 
 Money 
Supply  
Liquid 
Liabilities  
Banking sys. 
Efficiency 
Financial sys. 
Efficiency  
Banking sys. 
Activity  
Financial sys. 
Activity   
 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrob Pcrobof Z-Score 
        
Constant  -0.262 0.080 -0.856 -1.209** -0.728 -0.765 -1.442*** 
 (0.444) (0.847) (0.214) (0.036) (0.136) (0.122) (0.005) 
Inequality (-1) 0.888*** 0.889*** 0.912*** 0.911*** 0.885*** 0.887*** 0.905*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Finance  0.0004 -0.0006 -0.001** -0.264*** 0.0009 0.0001 0.001 
 (0.266) (0.180) (0.016) (0.000) (0.143) (0.799) (0.180) 
GDP per capita (GDPpc) 0.282*** 0.186 0.467** 0.586*** 0.431*** 0.445*** 0.599*** 
 (0.007) (0.120) (0.025) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
GDPpc×GDPpc -0.021*** -0.013 -0.034** -0.042*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.043*** 
 (0.006) (0.110) (0.021) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
AR(1) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098) (0.099) 
AR(2) (0.319) (0.326) (0.317) (0.310) (0.320) (0.326) (0.325) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.590) (0.674) (0.793) (0.812) (0.732) (0.667) (0.816) 
        
DHT for instruments        
(a) GMM Instruments for 
levels 
       
H excluding group (0.800) (0.815) (0.561) (0.608) (0.762) (0.758) (0.886) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.263) (0.348) (0.845) (0.832) (0.503) (0.406) (0.474) 
        
(b) gmm (lagged values)        
H excluding group (0.420) (0.447) (0.487) (0.491) (0.415) (0.452) (0.368) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.597) (0.677) (0.793) (0.813) (0.753) (0.667) (0.859) 
        
(c) IV (Propositions, Years, 
eq (diff)) 
       
H excluding group (0.777) (0.786) (0.723) (0.648) (0.710) (0.744) (0.445) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.353) (0.446) (0.677) (0.767) (0.594) (0.474) (0.902) 
        
Fisher  54786.82*** 18945.32*** 143361.64*** 28361.38*** 30832.20*** 38732.89*** 75821.87*** 
Instruments  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  585 585 587 585 585 585 536 
        
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and 
the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.Sys: system. Fin: financial.  
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